Last year at around this time, we published our 2016 outlook on the 10-year Treasury yield (“Our 2016 Outlook on U.S. Treasuries: 2.5% on the 10-Year“). To recall, we model our 10-year Treasury yield expectations with the following “building blocks” model:
10-year Treasury Yield = expected 10-year U.S. inflation + expected U.S. real GDP growth + global central bank purchases (including U.S. QE) + geopolitical premium
Note that the current “arbitrage” between the German & Japanese 10-year (typically done with a “dirty hedge” by hedge funds) with the U.S. 10-year is being taken into account in the above model, to the extent that ECB and BOJ purchases are driving such hedge fund “arbitrage” activity.
The reasoning behind our 2016 outlook of 2.5% (the 10-year is trading at 2.54% as of this writing) included: 1) higher U.S. inflation driven by the combination of a tightening U.S. job market, rising U.S. housing prices, and higher healthcare costs, and 2) the peaking of certain deflationary effects around the world, e.g. Chinese CPI was no longer declining while fears surrounding a larger-than-expected Chinese yuan devaluation would turn out to be unfounded.
Figure 1 below shows our timing calls on the U.S. 10-year from June 2015 to the present (note the prices of the 10-year Treasury rise as yields decline).
For 2017, I am targeting a 2.25% rate on the U.S. 10-year yield. The target is slightly out-of-consensus (Goldman, Morgan Stanley, and PIMCO are all expecting the 10-year to rise to 2.75% or above). The outlook, however, is very uncertain and I am again looking for significant (tradeable) volatility on the 10-year in 2017; by and large, however, I believe the factors that will drive the 10-year yield lower slightly outweigh the bearish factors on the 10-year:
- As of this writing, speculative longs on the U.S 10-year futures are–with the exception of early 2005–at their highest level since the collection of COT records beginning in 1992. From a contrarian standpoint, this should provide some short-term support for the 10-year (in turn resulting in lower yields);
- Much of the recent up-move in the U.S. 10-year yield occurred after the U.S. presidential election as investors speculated on a combination of higher growth and higher inflation, driven by the promise of: U.S. corporate & personal income tax cuts, a promised $1 trillion infrastructure spending package by President-elect Trump, potential repeal of the ACA and Dodd-Frank along with a myriad other U.S. “regulatory burdens.” As a reminder, however, this is all conjecture at this point. The Republicans are likely to pass their promised corporate & income tax cuts and to repeal the ACA through the reconciliation process (this is needed to avoid a Senate filibuster by the Democrats). However, such tax cuts passed through the reconciliation process needs to be revenue-neutral. Even with the potential to use “dynamic scoring” (where it is assumed lower taxes will result in higher GDP growth in order to offset some of the tax revenue lost), a significant part of the promised tax cuts will likely be scaled back in order to meet fiscal budget targets. E.g. The much discussed 15% or 20% statutory corporate income tax rate will likely be revised to 25%;
- In the long-run, the U.S. economy is still limited by the combination of slowing population growth (the current 0.77% annual population growth rate is the lowest since the 1930s), older (and less productive) demographics, and a potential stall in immigration–the latter of which has historically benefited the U.S. disproportionately (immigrants are twice as likely to be entrepreneurs than native-born Americans). Another historic tailwind for the U.S. economy actually peaked in 1999: women participation in the labor force has trended down since 2009.
Unless productivity growth jumps over the next several years (not likely; the “fracking revolution” was the last enabler of U.S. productivity growth), the U.S. economy is likely to stall at 2% real GDP growth, especially given the recent 14-year high in the U.S. dollar index–which will serve to encourage import growth and restrict export growth. Note this outlook assumes that the long-term U.S. inflation outlook remains “well-anchored” at 2.0%–should the U.S. Congress adopt a more populist outlook (i.e. higher fiscal spending that is likely to be monetized by the Fed in the next recession), then the 10-year could easily surpass 3.0% sometime in 2017.