U.S. Consumer Spending Yet to Overheat: Fed to Pause

According to the CME Fed Watch, the chance of a Fed rate hike this Wednesday is virtually zero. The reasons for the Fed to “stand pat” have been well recited but here they are again: 1) ongoing, elevated global systemic/slowdown risks due to the recent decline in global financial stocks, a Chinese economic slowdown, and chronically low oil prices resulting in fears of higher corporate defaults, 2) despite a recent pick-up in the U.S. core inflation rate (the 12-month change in the January core CPI is at 2.2%), the Fed’s preferred measure of core inflation, i.e. the 12-month change in the core PCE, remains tolerable at 1.7%, and 3) Since the late 1990s, the world’s developed economies have mostly grappled (unsuccessfully) with the specter of deflation; e.g. over the last 3 years, the Bank of Japan expanded its monetary base by 173%, and yet, the country is still struggling to achieve its target inflation rate of 2% (Japan’s January core CPI was flat year-over-year). As such, the Fed should err on the side of caution and back off from its recent rate hike campaign.

As of today, the CME Fed Watch is suggesting 50/50 odds of a 25 basis point rate hike at the Fed’s June 15 meeting. Historically, the Fed has only hiked when the odds rise to more than 60/40, and I believe this is the case here. Many things could change from now to June 15; however, given: 1) lingering fears over a Chinese slowdown and the loss of Chinese FOREX reserves, and 2) the fact that core PCE readings have not yet registered a +2.0% reading (I need the year-over-year change in the core PCE to sustain a level of over +2.0% for many months before I am convinced that inflation is a problem), I remain of the opinion that the next rate hike will mostly likely occur at the FOMC’s September 21 meeting.

Finally–despite an ongoing rise in U.S. employment levels (see Figure 1 below)–both U.S. wage growth (see Figure 2 below) and consumer spending growth (See Figure 3 below) remain anemic. Note that both U.S. wage growth and consumer spending growth do not “turn on a dime”; this means that–until or unless we witness a sustained rise in both U.S. wage and consumer spending growth–the Fed should err on the side of caution and back off on its rate hike campaign. At the earliest, this will mean a 25 basis point hike at the FOMC’s September 21 meeting.


Figure 2: Nominal Wage Growth Remains Below Target Despite Year-end 2015 Push




Leading Indicators Suggest a Stabilization in Global Risk Asset Prices

Even as the vast majority of analysts stayed bullish on the global economy and global risk assets early last year, I began to turn bearish for a variety of reasons, including: 1) global liquidity, as measured by the amount of US$ circulating freely in the global financial system, continued to weaken, 2) valuations in U.S. equities were at the 95th percentile of all readings dating back to the late 1970s, as measured on a P/B and P/E basis, 3) U.S. corporate profit margins were already at 50-year highs, while U.S. corporate profits as a percentage of U.S. GDP was at a high not seen since 1929, 4) U.S. corporate earnings growth, ex. energy, were beginning to decelerate, and 5) our proprietary leading indicator, the CB Capital Global Diffusion Index (“CBGDI”) was indicating a global economic slowdown, as well as a pullback in global equity and oil prices.

I have previously discussed the construction and implication of the CBGDI’s latest readings in many of our weekly newsletters, and last discussed it in this blog on May 15, 2015 (“Leading Indicators Suggest Lower U.S. Treasury Rates“). Specifically, the CBGDI is a global leading indicator which we construct by aggregating and equal-weighting the OECD leading indicators for 29 major countries, including non-OECD members such as China, Brazil, Turkey, India, Indonesia, and Russia. The CBGDI has also historically led the MSCI All-Country World Index and WTI crude oil prices since November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. Historically, the rate of change (i.e. the 2nd derivative) of the CBGDI has led WTI crude oil prices by three months with an R-squared of 30%, while leading the MSCI All-Country World Index slightly, with an R-squared of over 40% (naturally as stock prices is typically one component of the OECD leading indicators).

In my May 15, 2015 blog entry, I also stated:

Our own studies suggest the global economy has been slowing down significantly since the 2nd half of last year [i.e. 2014]; more importantly, the negative momentum has not abated much … the 2nd derivative of the CBGDI has gotten weaker. It also extended its decline below the 1st derivative, which in the past has led to a slowdown or even a major downturn in the global economy, including a downturn in global asset prices.”

The rest is history, as they say.

Recent readings of the CBGDI, however, paint a much brighter picture. Firstly, both the 1st and 2nd derivatives of the CBGDI have stabilized and are now increasing. Secondly, both global equity prices (i.e. the MSCI All-Country World Index) and oil prices have declined to levels that are indicative of a more severe slowdown than the CBGDI readings imply (see Figure 1 below). To me, the latest readings of the CBGDI suggests–at the very least–a stabilization, if not an immediate rally, in both global equity and oil prices.




Margin Debt Outstanding Remains High but Suggests an Oversold Market

A client said: “U.S. margin debt outstanding remains at a very high level; as such, I expect U.S. stocks to correct further.”

We last discussed the overbought condition in U.S. stocks as measured by U.S. margin debt outstanding in our January 29, 2014 blog entry (“Record Rise in Margin Debt Outstanding = Single-Digit Stock Returns in 2014“). U.S. margin debt outstanding stood at $478.5 billion at the time (measured as of December 31, 2013), after rising by $123 billion over the previous 12 months. The rapid rate of margin debt growth at the time suggests a highly overbought market. For comparison, the 12-month increase in margin debt outstanding leading to the March 2000 peak was $134 billion; for July 2007, an unprecedented $160 billion. At the time, we stated that this rapid accumulation of margin debt would lead to tepid stock returns going forward. The S&P 500 stood at 1,848.56 as of December 31, 2013; as I am typing this, the S&P 500 is trading at just shy of 1,900. After two years, the S&P 500 has gone nowhere; although your portfolio would’ve performed well if you had an overweight in consumer discretionary and tech; less so if you had an overweight in energy or materials.

As of December 31, 2015, U.S. margin debt outstanding stood at $503.4 billion–a tepid $25 billion increase over a period of two years. With the recent sell-off in U.S. stocks, margin debt would likely have declined by at least $20 billion this month. This means U.S. margin debt outstanding as it stands today is likely to have revert to its December 31, 2013 levels. Figure 1 below shows the 3-, 6-, and 12-month absolute change (in $ billions) in U.S. margin debt outstanding from January 1998 to December 2015.


A margin debt outstanding of around $480 billion is still high by historical standards; however–based on the 3-, 6-, and 12-month rate of change–U.S. margin debt outstanding is actually at an oversold level–reminiscent of similarly oversold levels in late 1998, early 2008, and the 2nd half of 2011. In two of these instances (late 1998 and the 2nd half of 2011), the S&P 500’s subsequent returns were phenomenal (38% and 27%, respectively, over the next 12 months); in the case of early 2008, however, not so much. With that said, March 2008 still represented a tradeable bottom–as long as one got out of U.S. stocks by summer of 2008.

As I discussed with my clients, I do not believe the current liquidation in energy, materials, and EM assets will morph into a globally systemic event. As such, I believe U.S. stock returns will be decent over the next 6-12 months.

Our 2016 Outlook on U.S. Treasuries: 2.5% on the 10-Year

In our June 28 global macro newsletter (please email me for a copy), I upgraded our outlook on U.S. Treasuries when the 10-year Treasury yield closed at 2.49%. We believed the 10-year was too high given the ongoing deflationary pressures stemming from the European sovereign debt crisis, the Chinese economic slowdown, and lower commodity prices. I subsequently downgraded U.S. Treasuries in our August 30 newsletter–when the 10-year Treasury yield closed at 2.19% (after dipping to as low as 2.00% during the August 24 global equity market correction)–as I believed global deflationary pressures were in the process of peaking. At the time, I noted that: 1) Chinese disposable income was still growing at high single-digits, 2) the Chinese CPI for the monthly of July sat at 1.6% year-over-year, and 3) fears over a further, deeper-than-expected devaluation of the Chinese yuan against the US$ was unfounded, as Chinese policymakers still have political incentive to support the country’s currency, along with the firepower to do so (as of today, China’s FOREX reserves stands at $3.43 trillion, while its November 2015 trade surplus is still near a record high at $54 billion). This means any further deflationary pressures from the Chinese economy were dissipating.

Combined with the Greek government’s 11th hour deal with the European Commission (i.e. Germany and France), fears over a more catastrophic financial market dislocation was adverted. This means that U.S. Treasury yields should rise further in the coming months. In our August 30 newsletter, I slapped a target yield of 2.50% for the 10-year Treasury over the next six months.


For 2016, I am reiterating our 2.50% yield target for the 10-year Treasury. We model our 10-year Treasury yield expectations with the following “building blocks” model:

10-year Treasury Yield = expected 10-year U.S. inflation + expected U.S. real GDP growth + global central bank purchases (including U.S. QE) + geopolitical premium

While both energy and base metal prices have either broken or are approaching their December 2008-March 2009 lows, I am of the opinion that U.S. inflation will be higher next year as the combination of a tighter U.S. job market, rising U.S. housing prices, and higher healthcare costs overwhelm the deflationary effects of lower commodity prices on the U.S. consumer economy (of which the CPI is based on).

As the markets price in higher U.S. inflation and a more hawkish Fed policy next year, I expect the 10-year Treasury yield to rise to 2.5% sometime in the next several months. For now, I remain bearish on U.S. Treasuries, but may shift to a more bullish stance should: 1) the Chinese economic slowdown runs deeper-than-expected, 2) the U.S. stock market continues to weaken, or 3) the Fed adopts a more dovish-than-expected bias post the December 16 FOMC meeting.

The Re-leveraging of Corporate America – Part II

We last discussed the increasing leverage in U.S. corporate balance sheets in our April 1, 2015 commentary (“The Re-leveraging of Corporate America and the U.S. Stock Market“), when we asserted that the combination of historically high U.S. stock market valuations, extremely high participation in the U.S. stock market by hedge fund managers (from a contrarian standpoint), and near-record high corporate leverage makes the U.S. stock market highly vulnerable to a major correction over the next several months.

At the time, we noted that U.S. corporate debt issuance averaged $650 billion a year during the 2012-2014 time frame, or 40% higher than the 2009-2011 period. Moreover, U.S. corporate debt issuance was on track to hit a record high in 2015, buoyed by the ongoing surge in M&A activity, sponsor-backed IPOs (companies tend to be highly leveraged upon a private equity sponsor exit), along with record share buybacks and the pressure to increase dividends. At the time, we noted that U.S. corporate debt issuance was on track to hit $1 trillion this year.

Since April 1, U.S. corporate debt issuance has continued to increase, although the pace has slowed down since concerns about the Greek debt crisis and the Chinese economic slowdown materialized this summer. Moreover–with energy and metals prices still underperforming–high-yield issuance has slowed down dramatically, although investment-grade issuance has continued to plough ahead. Nonetheless, U.S. corporate issuance has already set a record high this year, with nearly $800 billion of debt issued on a YTD basis (as of last Friday). At the current rate, U.S. corporate debt issuance could still hit $900 billion this year given the still-substantial pipeline of debt issuance driven by the recent frenzy of M&A activity.

Figure 1: U.S. Corporate Debt Issuance at Record Highs ($ billions)


Moreover, U.S. net cash levels–that of Apple notwithstanding–have been crumbling under ever-increasing dividend yields, corporate buybacks, and M&A activity. Figure 2 below shows the substantial increase of debt/EBITDA ratios in Goldman’s universe coverage–especially since 2011–while companies with positive net cash levels are down by about one-third in the same time frame.

Figure 2: Rising Corporate Leverage While Cash Levels Continue to Decline

uscorporateleveragevscashDespite the August correction, we believe U.S. stocks remain overvalued. Combined with increasing and near-record high corporate leverage levels, this leaves U.S. stocks in a highly vulnerable position. With the Fed poised to begin a new rate hike cycle at the December 16 FOMC meeting , we believe there is a strong likelihood of a more substantial (15%-20%) correction in the S&P 500 from peak to trough sometime in 2016.

Why China Will Not Cut Rates Any Further This Year

In response to a slowing property market, lower consumer spending growth, and a slowing global economy, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has cut its one-year policy rate five times and its reserve requirement ratio three times over the last 12 months. Last November, the PBOC’s one-year policy rate sat at 6.00%–today, it is at 4.60%. Moreover, the PBOC’s cut in its reserve requirement ratio–from 20.0% to 18.0% since February–has released more than $400 billion in additional liquidity/lending capacity for the Chinese financial system.

I believe Chinese policymakers will maintain an easing bias over the next 6-12 months given the following:

  1. As I discussed a couple of years ago, a confluence of factors–including China’s debt build-up since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, slowing population growth, as well as natural limits to an export- and CAPEX-driven growth model–means China’s real GDP growth will slow to the 5%-8% range over the next several years. Consensus suggests that China’s real GDP growth will be lower than the official target of 7% this year. Given China’s significant debt build-up since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, policymakers will need to do more to lower lending costs and to encourage further lending as global economic growth continues to slow;
  2. Most of the debt build-up in China’s economy over the last 7 years has occurred within the country’s corporate sector–with real estate developers incurring much of the leverage. In other words, both real estate prices and investments are the most systemically important components of the Chinese economy. While real estate prices and sales in Tier 1 cities have been strong this year, those of Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities have not yet stabilized. This means policymakers will maintain an easing bias unless Chinese real estate sales and prices recover on a broader basis;
  3. Chinese credit growth in August met expectations, but demand for new loans did not. Real borrowing rates for the Chinese manufacturing sector is actually rising due to overcapacity issues and deteriorating balance sheets (China’s factory activity just hit its lowest level since March 2009). No doubt Chinese policymakers will strive to lower lending costs to the embattled manufacturing sector as the latter accounts for about one-third of the country’s GDP and employs 15% of all workers. This will be accompanied by a concerted effort to ease China’s manufacturing/industrial overcapacity issues through more infrastructure investments both domestically and in China’s neighboring countries (encouraged by loans through the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, for example).

I contend, however, that the PBOC is done with cutting its one-year policy rate for this year, as Chinese policymakers are dealing with a more pressing issue: stabilizing the Chinese currency, the yuan, against the US$ in the midst of recent capital outflows (Goldman Sachs estimates that China’s August capital outflows totaled $178 billion). Simply put–by definition–a country cannot prop up its currency exchange rate while easing monetary policy and maintaining a relatively open capital account at the same time. With the PBOC putting all its resources into defending the yuan while capital outflows continue, it will be self-defeating if the PBOC cuts its policy rate at the same time. The PBOC’s current lack of monetary policy flexibility is the main reason why Chinese policymakers are trying to find ways to stem capital outflows.

Rather than easing monetary policy, Chinese policymakers are utilizing other means to directly increase economic growth, such as: 1) Cutting minimum down payment requirements for first-time home buyers from 30% to 25%, 2) Approving new subway projects in Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenzhen worth a total of $73 billion over the next six years, and 3) Cutting sales taxes on automobile purchases from 10% to 5%, effective to the end of 2016. I expect the PBOC to regain its monetary policy flexibility by early next year, as the combination of record-high trade surpluses and still-low external debt should allow China to renew its policy of accumulating FOREX reserves yet again.

The U.S. Needs to Rejuvenate the Global Supercomputing Race

Technology, along with increasing access to cheap energy, is the lifeblood of a growing, modern economy. As we discussed in our December 2, 2012 article (“The Global Productivity Riddle and the Supercomputing Race“), fully 85% of productivity growth in the 20th century could be attributed to technological progress, as well as increasing accessibility/sharing of cheap energy sources due to innovations in oil and natural gas hydraulic fracturing, ultra-deep water drilling, solar panel productivity, and the commercialization of Generation III+ nuclear power plants and deployment of smart power grids.

Perhaps the most cited example where the combined effects of technological and human capital investments have had the most economic impact is the extreme decline in computing and communication costs. Moore’s Law, the ability of computer engineers to double the amount of computing power in any given space every 2 years, has been in effect since the invention of the transistor in the late 1940s. Parallel to this has been the rise of the supercomputing industry. Started by Seymour Cray at Control Data Corporation in the 1960s, the supercomputing industry has played a paramount role in advancing the sciences, most recently in computationally intensive fields such as weather forecasting, oil and gas exploration, human genome sequencing, molecular modeling, and physical simulations with the purpose of designing more aerodynamic aircrafts or better conducting materials. No doubt, breakthroughs in more efficient supercomputing technologies and processes is integral to the ongoing growth in our living standards in the 21st century.

Unfortunately, advances in both the U.S. and global supercomputing industry has lagged in the last several years. Every six months, a list of the world’s top 500 most powerful supercomputers is published. The latest list was compiled in June 2015; aside from providing the most up-to-date supercomputing statistics, the semi-annual list also publishes the historical progress of global supercomputing power, each country’s share of global supercomputing power, as well as a reasonable accurate projection of what lies ahead. Figure 1 below is a log chart summarizing the progression of the top 500 list from its inception in 1993.

Figure 1: Historical Performance of the World’s Top 500 Supercomputers

top500progressAs shown in Figure 1 above, both the sum of the world’s top 500 computing power, as well as the #1 ranked supercomputer, has remained relatively stagnant over the last several years. Just three years ago, there was serious discussion of the commercialization of an “exaflop” supercomputer (i.e. a supercomputer capable of 1 x 10^18 calculations per second) by the 2018-2019 time frame. Today, the world’s top computer scientists are targeting a more distant time frame of 2023.

From the U.S. perspective, the slowdown in the advent of the supercomputing industry is even more worrying. Not only has innovation slowed down at the global level, but the U.S. share of global supercomputing power has been declining as well. Three years ago, the U.S. housed 55% of the world’s top 500 supercomputing power; Japan was second, with 12% of the world’s supercomputing power. Rounding out the top five were China (8%), Germany (6%), and France (5%). Today, the U.S. houses only 46% of the world’s supercomputing power, with countries such as the UK, India, Korea, and Russia gaining ground.

Figure 2: Supercomputing Power Distributed by Country


Bottom line: Since the invention of the transistor in the late 1940s and the advent of the supercomputing industry in the 1960s, the U.S. has always led the supercomputing industry in terms of innovation and sheer computing power. With countries such as China and India further industrializing and developing their computer science/engineering expertise (mostly with government funding), U.S. policymakers must encourage and provide more resources to stay ahead of the supercomputing race. To that end, President Obama’s most recent executive order calling for the creation of a National Strategic Computing Initiative–with the goal of building an “exascale” supercomputer–is a step in the right direction. At this point, however, whether the industry can deploy an energy-efficient exascale supercomputer by the less ambitious 2023 time frame is still an open question.

Chinese Casino Gaming Companies Up Despite Chinese Stock Market Rout

Just over two weeks ago, I was interviewed by CNBC Asia; they asked what I was advising my clients to purchase in the Chinese stock market. I specifically mentioned two Chinese companies that are traded offshore – in this case, I discussed Melco Crown (MPEL) and Las Vegas Sands (LVS). MPEL is up +10.1% while LVS is up +6.7% since the day of the June 21st interview. Meanwhile, the Shanghai Composite Index is down by 16.7% in the same time frame.

Policymakers have dealt Chinese casino gaming companies a bad hand (pun intended), e.g. limiting the number of Macau visas, full smoking ban at the casinos, and monitoring Chinese VIP customers, but in general, Chinese casino gaming companies are well-run; despite the slowdown in visitations over the last 18 months, Chinese casinos are enjoying positive cash flow in an oligopolistic market (the government has only awarded six gambling licenses and have limited the number of tables available to patrons). Both MPEL and LVS are poised to take advantage of the ongoing growth in Chinese casino gaming & entertainment spending, driven by the more profitable mass-market clientele in the future.

Three Key Policies to a Successful “Make In India” Initiative

Launched by the Narendra Modi-led government last September, the “Make In India” initiative is a long-term, top-down driven policy to transform India into a global manufacturing hub. The 25 economic sectors targeted by the Indian government for export-led development were those determined to possess global trade comparative advantages or significant potential for innovation and job creation. Some of these sectors include: automobiles, aviation, biotechnology, chemicals, defense, electrical machinery, food processing, media & entertainment, pharmaceuticals, railways, renewable energy, and textiles & garments.

In my recent weekly newsletters–and in my March 4, 2015 Forbes column (“Modi’s Budget Boosts Bullish Outlook for Indian Stocks“)–I have chronicled and discussed the recent re-acceleration of India’s economic growth due to a combination of government reform efforts and the decline in oil prices, the latter of which provided an immediate 3%-3.5% boost to India’s annual GDP. Since August last year, I have asserted that India’s economic growth rate would surpass that of China; this year, I expect India’s GDP to grow at about 8%–higher than China’s expected GDP growth rate which I expect to come in at 7% or below.

Recent economic data–such as April’s industrial production year-over-year growth of 4.1% (surpassing consensus by more than 200 bps) and May’s benign CPI reading of 5.0%–suggests that my Indian economic outlook is on track. With the Reserve Bank of India’s policy repo rate still at 7.25%, there remains significant room for the Indian central bank to ease monetary policy in order to maintain the country’s high growth rates, as long as the CPI reading stays below 6.0%.

I maintain that India’s long-term growth trajectory remains intact; I expect the size of India’s economy to double by the end of 2020–to $4 trillion or more–and for the earnings of the MSCI India equity index to more than double in the same time frame. In the past, I have discussed several reform policies and trends that would act as secular tailwinds for the India economy, including: 1) a concerted crackdown of cronyism and corruption and raising foreign direct investment caps from 26% to 49% in the insurance and defense industries–both of which would heavily encourage more FDI inflows into India, 2) a renewed focus on infrastructure investments–including a nationwide 4G network–as well as much-needed land reforms to encourage further industrialization, 3) rising confidence in the leadership of the Reserve Bank of India as Governor Rajan asserted the central bank’s independence with an inflation-targeting framework that was recently codified into law, and 4) India’s uniquely young and educated workforce.

I consider the “Make in India” initiative to be a major policy focus that is essential to India’s long-term economic development. Unlike China’s “growth at all costs” policy from 1978 to 2008–i.e. a 19th century style command-and-control network of various centralized systems of production–while taking advantage of low-cost labor and lax environmental regulations, India is encouraging the production of higher value-added goods through a more decentralized approach of empowering decision-makers at the corporate level. At the same time, India’s labor laws have historically offered a high degree of protection for workers. To a major extent, India’s historical rejection of the 19th century style of command-and-control capitalism has limited the country’s industrialization and consequently, its export sector of manufactured goods. Of course, over the last 25 years, India’s exports have increased both as a share of GDP and world exports–but this was mostly driven by increases in the exports of services and primary products & resources (i.e. rice, cotton, diamonds, iron ore, etc. )–as opposed to the exports of medium- and high-tech manufactured goods.

Figure 1: India – Exports of Goods and Services, 1991-2013 (source: IMF)


Since 1991, total Indian exports as a share of Indian GDP rose from around 8% to almost 25% in 2013; while Indian exports as a share of world exports tripled from around 0.5% to 1.7% during the same time frame. Of note, however, is the rapid increase in Indian service exports in just the recent decade. From 2000-2013, Indian services exports as a share of world services exports have tripled to over 3.0%.

Growth in Indian services exports has been rapid; indeed, it has surpassed that of other EM countries by a wide margin (see Figure 2 below). Indian services now make up 35% of all of the country’s exports, which is even higher than the average in advanced economies.

Figure 2: Growth in Services Exports – India and EM Countries, 2000-2012 (source: IMF)


The vast majority of fast-growing EM economies over the last several decades relied on industrialization and subsequent growth of manufacturing exports (both absolute and relative to total exports) to jump-start their economies. In 2013, for example, China’s manufacturing exports accounted for 90% of total exports, double the share during 1980-85. The share of Indian manufacturing exports as a share of total exports, however, has actually declined over the last 15 years, due to India’s over-reliance on growth driven by the services and primary goods & resources industries. Within the goods sector, the share of manufacturing has declined over the last decade as well (see Figure 3 below).

Figure 3: Composition of Goods Exports for Selected EM Countries, 2000-04 vs. 2007-11


To jump-start the “Make In India” initiative to turn India into a global manufacturing hub, I believe the following three key policies need to be adopted–either at the public- or private-sector level.

  1. Build human capital and liberalize the Indian labor market: Consensus suggests that the Indian manufacturing sector faces an existential problem when it comes to labor: despite a young, educated labor force, there is a shortage of qualified labor for the sector, as those who are qualified do not want to work in manufacturing. One way to entice workers into the industry is to focus on medium-tech or high-tech goods requiring innovation in an effort to boost the technological capacity of India and to raise manufacturing wages. Labor law reforms, along with a policy to integrate manufacturers into the education ecosystem, are also necessary in order to boost the competitiveness of the Indian manufacturing sector in the global markets;
  2. Investing in export- and manufacturing-related infrastructure: IMF studies have shown that bottlenecks among the energy, mining, transportation, and storage sectors have inhibited India from taking advantage of the devaluation of the Indian rupee over the last several years. Land reforms is also part of the economic agenda, as regulations have historically prevented or limited the rise of industries in urban areas, where most skilled labor is located;
  3. Trade reforms to expand trade in the long-run: Historically, the Indian government has utilized trade policy as a tool to address short-term objectives such as limiting inflation or minimizing the volatility in commodity prices. Such incoherent policies included export taxes, minimum export prices, and ad hoc adjustments to import duties. The World Trade Organization noted that in its last review, minimum export prices for onions, sugar, and potato were changed in order to control the domestic supply of vegetables. Such policies increase uncertainty for both exporters and importers – major trade reforms are thus needed to provide a long-term boost to Indian manufacturing exports.

Leading Indicators Suggest Lower U.S. Treasury Rates

In two of our most recent commentaries (April 10, 2015: “Our Leading Indicators Still Suggest Lower Asset Prices” and March 12, 2015: “The Weakening of the CB Capital Global Diffusion Index Suggests Lower Asset Prices“), we discussed why Goldman Sachs’ Global Leading Indicator was giving highly misleading leading signals on the global economy given its over-reliance on components such as the Baltic Dry Index and commodity prices–both of which could be highly impacted by idiosyncratic factors such as supply disruptions or technological substitutions. Indeed, Goldman itself has been highly transparent and critical over the last six months about the distortions created by an oversupply of dry bulk shipping capacity and an impending wall of additional supply of industrial metals, such as copper and iron ore.

Indeed–because of these distortions–Goldman’s GLI has been highly volatile over the last six months. Last month’s GLI suggested the global economy was “contracting” from January-March 2015–which in retrospect, does not make much sense. Meanwhile, our own studies had suggested that global economic growth was still on par to hit 3.5% in 2015–while our earlier studies suggested U.S. economic growth could hit as much as 3.0%–with energy-importing countries such as India projected to accelerate to as much as 7%-8% GDP growth.

Because again of such idiosyncratic factors, Goldman’s GLI this month suggests the global economy is now moving into “expansion” mode. January data was revised and now suggests the global economy was merely “contracting” that month, with February-March barely in contraction phases. None of these make sense. The latest upbeat data is due to: rising base metals prices, a bounce in the AU$ and the CA$, and a bounce in the highly volatile Baltic Dry Index. Copper’s latest rise was arguably due to Chinese short-covering–Chinese property starts/fixed asset investments remain weak, although we are optimistic that both Chinese commercial and residential inventories are re-balancing.

Our own studies suggest the global economy has been slowing down significantly since the 2nd half of last year; more importantly, the negative momentum has not abated much (despite the re-acceleration of Western European economic growth). Specifically, we utilize a global leading indicator (called the CB Capital Global Diffusion Index, or CBGDI) where we aggregate and equal-weight the OECD leading indicators for 29 major countries, including non-OECD (but globally significant) members such as China, Brazil, Turkey, India, Indonesia, and Russia. The OECD’s Composite Leading Indicators possess a better statistical track record as a leading indicator of global asset prices and economic growth. Instead of relying on the prices of commodities or commodity currencies, the OECD meticulously constructs a Composite Leading Indicator for each country that it monitors by quantifying country-specific components including: 1) housing permits issued, 2) orders & inventory turnover, 3) stock prices, 4) interest rates & interest rate spreads, 5) changes in manufacturing employment, 6) consumer confidence, 7) monetary aggregates, 8) retail sales, 9) industrial & manufacturing production, and 10) passenger car registrations, among others. Each of the OECD’s country-specific leading indicator is fully customized depending on the particular factors driving a country’s economic growth.

The CBGDI has historically led or tracked the MSCI All-Country World Index and WTI crude oil prices since November 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell. Historically, the rate of change (i.e. the 2nd derivative) of the CBGDI has led WTI crude oil prices by three months with an R-squared of 30%, while leading the MSCI All-Country World Index slightly, with an R-squared of over 40% (naturally as stock prices is typically one component of the OECD leading indicators).

Since we last discussed the CBGDI on April 10, the 2nd derivative of the CBGDI has gotten weaker. It also extended its decline below the 1st derivative, which in the past has led to a slowdown or even a major downturn in the global economy, including a downturn in global asset prices. Figure 1 below is a monthly chart showing the year-over-year % change in the CBGDI, along with the rate of change (2nd derivative) of the CBGDI, versus the year-over-year % change in WTI crude oil prices and the MSCI All-Country World Index from January 1994 to May 2015. All four indicators are smoothed on a three-month moving average basis:


The CBGDI has also led the U.S. 10-year Treasury rate on most occasions over the last 20 years. Whenever the 2nd derivative declines to near the zero line (and continues down), U.S. 10-year Treasury rates have declined 86% of the time over the next 3, 6, and 12 months. Yes, we did enjoy a secular bull market in the U.S. long bond over the last 20 years, but 86% upside frequency is still a very good track record during a secular bull market. The track record is especially attractive considering that: 1) when this indicator was wrong, the worst outcome was a 27 bps rise (over 3 months beginning December 2004); 2) when this indicator was dead on, the best outcome was a highly-profitable, and highly-asymmetric, 168 bps decline in the U.S. long bond (over 12 months beginning December 2007).


As of this writing, the U.S. 10-year rate is trading at 2.18%, which is 14 basis points higher than the average 10-year rate of 2.04% during March 2015, when the 2nd derivative of the CBGDI essentially touched the zero line. As we discussed in past newsletters (and will further elaborate this weekend), we do not believe the ECB has lost control of the Euro Zone’s sovereign bond market. Combined with the ongoing BOJ easing, both central banks are still projected to purchase another $1 trillion of sovereign bonds over the next 12 months. With the U.S. federal budget deficit still near its lowest level over the last six years–and with the People’s Central Bank of China proactively lowering interest rates–I do not believe the U.S. 10-year Treasury rate has any room to move higher from current levels. As such, we are advocating a long position in long-dated U.S. Treasuries; our Absolute Return Liquidity strategy now has a sizable position in the long-dated Treasury ETF, TLT.